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In recent years a number of European countries have shifted their tax structure more 
strongly towards indirect taxes, motivated, inter alia, by the intention to foster 
competitiveness. Against this background, this paper develops a tractable two-country 
model of a monetary union, characterised by national fiscal and supranational 
monetary policy, with price-setting firms and endogenously determined terms of 
trade. The paper discusses a number of monetary and fiscal policy questions which 
emerge if one of the countries shifts its tax structure more strongly towards indirect 
taxes. Qualitatively, it is shown that the long-run effects of such a unilateral policy 
shift on output and consumption within and between the two countries depend 
sensitively on whether indirect tax revenues are used to lower direct taxes or to 
finance additional government expenditures. Moreover, short-run dynamics are shown 
to depend significantly on the speed at which fiscal adjustments take place, on the 
choice of the inflation index stabilised by the central bank, and on whether the tax 
shift is anticipated or not. Quantitatively, the calibrated model version indicates that 
only if the additional indirect tax revenues are used to finance a cut in direct taxes 
there is some, though limited scope for non-negligible spillovers between countries. 
 
Keywords: Fiscal regimes, Monetary policy, Currency union 
 
JEL Classification: E61, E63, F42. 
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It is well-known that the structures of taxation differ significantly between European 
countries. One important source of cross-country differences is the role of indirect 
taxes. In the year 2006, the share of indirect taxes in total taxation (including social 
security contributions) stood for the European Union as a whole at 34.9%. Yet, the 
dispersion of this share across countries was substantial, ranging from about 50% in 
Bulgaria and Cyprus to about 30% in Belgium, Germany, and the Czech Republic. 
At the same time, notwithstanding this variation across countries, the share for the 
EU as a whole has risen over time and was in 2006 by 1.2pp higher than in 1995. 
Overall, indirect taxes have become the main source of tax revenues in the EU 
(amounting in 2006 to 13.9% of GDP), followed by direct taxes (13.5% of GDP) 
and social security contributions (12.5% of GDP). These developments reflect that 
in recent years a number of countries have decided to give indirect taxes (relative to 
taxes on labour), at least at the margin, a more prominent role in their tax systems. 
Moreover, there is an ongoing debate whether employment and output prospects of 
European countries can be systematically improved via reforms that involve a more 
broad-based shift of the tax structure from direct taxes and social security 
contributions towards indirect taxes. 
 
What can be expected from reform proposals which advocate a shift of tax systems 
towards indirect taxes? This paper starts out from the idea that, when addressing this 
inherently complex question, it is helpful to distinguish from a general equilibrium 
perspective between open and closed economy aspects. We focus on the first type of 
aspects. In particular, this paper is inspired by the observation that one argument 
that is typically used in this context refers to the desirability to improve the 
competitiveness of economies. This particular argument relies largely on the idea 
that in an open economy context there seems to be scope for balanced-budget tax 
reforms which shift the tax incidence towards ‘immobile’ consumers and at the 
same time, through lower direct taxes, make tradeable production more competitive. 
This reasoning (which is commonly labeled as the ‘fiscal devaluation hypothesis’), 
however, is controversial. In particular, competitive equilibrium analysis of a small 
price-taking economy suggests that an across-the-board increase in consumption 
taxes (which do not discriminate between domestic and imported consumption 
goods and are rebated on exports), accompanied by a balanced-budget cut in labour 
taxes, may well be neutral with respect to trade, as summarised by Feldstein and 
Krugman (1990). In other words, the fiscal devaluation hypothesis may have no bite 
unless the terms of trade themselves react to changes in the tax structure. 
 
Motivated by these broad observations, this paper addresses the fiscal devaluation 
hypothesis in a two-country model of a monetary union with endogenously derived 
terms of trade. The model, which is similar to Benigno (2004), Duarte and Wolman 
(2008), and Ferrero (2009), is kept deliberately small in order to allow for a 
transparent discussion of a broad range of monetary and fiscal policy aspects which 
emerge if one member country of a monetary union unilaterally shifts its tax 
structure from direct towards indirect taxes. Focusing on both long-run and short-
run effects, we link the fiscal devaluation channel to a number of features like the 
size and the degree of openness of the two countries, the speed at which the increase 
in indirect taxes leads to a compensating decline in direct taxes, the choice of the 
inflation index stabilized by monetary policy, and the role of anticipation effects of 6
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pre-announced fiscal reforms. Our main finding is that qualitatively all these 
features matter for the strength of the fiscal devaluation channel and the exact shape 
of dynamic adjustment patterns. Quantitatively, however, our conclusion is rather 
unambiguous. The calibrated model indicates that there is at best limited scope for 
non-negligible spillovers between countries under any specification we investigate. 
Moreover, we show in a separate exercise that the fiscal devaluation channel 
disappears if the additional indirect tax revenues are used to increase government 
expenditures rather than to lower direct taxes. 
 
      Key features of the model are as follows. To allow for non-trivial price-setting 
decisions of firms, production in both countries is characterised by Dixit-Stiglitz-
type monopolistic competition. Monetary policy has a meaningful stabilisation role 
because of nominal price rigidities, in line with New Keynesian reasoning (see 
Calvo (1983), Clarida et al. (1999), and Woodford (2003)). Moreover, monetary 
policy is supranational and follows a Taylor-type feedback rule, targeting union-
wide variables. By contrast, fiscal policy is country-specific, and government 
expenditures and interest payments on outstanding government debt can be financed 
through a linear (and non-discriminating) consumption tax or a linear tax on labour 
income (with labour being the only factor of production). Fiscal policymakers 
follow feedback rules which anchor the economies at country-specific target levels 
of government debt, similar to Leeper (1991), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) and 
Leith and von Thadden (2008). Each country is specialised in the production of a 
composite tradeable good which is consumed in both countries. Firms set identical 
producer prices in both countries and the terms of trade (i.e. the producer price ratio 
between the two composite tradeable goods) depend in general equilibrium, inter 
alia, on the structure of taxes and government expenditures in the two countries. The 
two countries may be of different relative size, measured in terms of the share of 
goods produced in a country, holding constant the total number of goods produced 
in the monetary union. Finally, we assume complete asset markets between the two 
countries such that net foreign asset movements play no role. 
 
   7
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1 Introduction
It is well-known that the structures of taxation di⁄er signi￿cantly between European countries. One
important source of cross-country di⁄erences is the role of indirect taxes. In the year 2006, the share of
indirect taxes in total taxation (including social security contributions) stood for the European Union
as a whole at 34.9%. Yet, the dispersion of this share across countries was substantial, ranging from
about 50% in Bulgaria and Cyprus to about 30% in Belgium, Germany, and the Czech Republic. At
the same time, notwithstanding this variation across countries, the share for the EU as a whole has
risen over time and was in 2006 by 1.2pp higher than in 1995. Overall, indirect taxes have become the
main source of tax revenues in the EU (amounting in 2006 to 13.9% of GDP), followed by direct taxes
(13.5% of GDP) and social security contributions (12.5% of GDP).1 These developments re￿ ect that in
recent years a number of countries have decided to give indirect taxes (relative to taxes on labour), at
least at the margin, a more prominent role in their tax systems. Moreover, there is an ongoing debate
whether employment and output prospects of European countries can be systematically improved via
reforms that involve a more broad-based shift of the tax structure from direct taxes and social security
contributions towards indirect taxes.2
What can be expected from reform proposals which advocate a shift of tax systems towards indirect
taxes? This paper starts out from the idea that, when addressing this inherently complex question,
it is helpful to distinguish from a general equilibrium perspective between open and closed economy
aspects. We focus on the ￿rst type of aspects.3 In particular, this paper is inspired by the observation
that one argument that is typically used in this context refers to the desirability to improve the
competitiveness of economies. This particular argument relies largely on the idea that in an open
economy context there seems to be scope for balanced-budget tax reforms which shift the tax incidence
towards ￿ immobile￿ consumers and at the same time, through lower direct taxes, make tradeable
production more competitive. This reasoning (which is commonly labeled as the ￿ ￿scal devaluation
hypothesis￿ ), however, is controversial. In particular, competitive equilibrium analysis of a small
price-taking economy suggests that an across-the-board increase in consumption taxes (which do
not discriminate between domestic and imported consumption goods and are rebated on exports),
accompanied by a balanced-budget cut in labour taxes, may well be neutral with respect to trade, as
summarised by Feldstein and Krugman (1990). In other words, the ￿scal devaluation hypothesis may
have no bite unless the terms of trade themselves react to changes in the tax structure.4
Motivated by these broad observations, this paper addresses the ￿scal devaluation hypothesis in a
two-country model of a monetary union with endogenously derived terms of trade. The model, which
is similar to Benigno (2004), Duarte and Wolman (2008), and Ferrero (2009), is kept deliberately
small in order to allow for a transparent discussion of a broad range of monetary and ￿scal policy
aspects which emerge if one member country of a monetary union unilaterally shifts its tax structure
from direct towards indirect taxes. Focusing on both long-run and short-run e⁄ects, we link the ￿scal
devaluation channel to a number of features like the size and the degree of openness of the two
countries, the speed at which the increase in indirect taxes leads to a compensating decline in direct
1For a detailed description of European taxation structures from a cross-country perspective, see, in particular,
European Commission (2008). The reported numbers (which are taken from this study) do not yet include the e⁄ects
of the substantial increase in German VAT by 3pp in 2007 which was partly o⁄set by reduced contributions to the
unemployment insurance scheme.
2For a broad discussion of recent policy initiatives and proposals that advocate a shift of tax systems towards indirect
taxes, both at the European level and within individual member countries, see European Commission (2006, 2008).
3We touch on the second type of aspects in Section 4 which discusses a closed economy version of our set-up as a
limiting case. Yet, as argued in this section, our model is too stylised to address closed-economy aspects in much detail.
4Within the European context, the ￿scal devaluation hypothesis may have particular appeal for countries belonging
to the euro area which share an irrevocably ￿xed nominal exchange rate, a feature which makes it elusive to a⁄ect the
competitiveness of economies through nominal exchange rate adjustments.8
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taxes, the choice of the in￿ ation index stabilized by monetary policy, and the role of anticipation
e⁄ects of pre-announced ￿scal reforms. Our main ￿nding is that qualitatively all these features matter
for the strength of the ￿scal devaluation channel and the exact shape of dynamic adjustment patterns.
Quantitatively, however, our conclusion is rather unambiguous. The calibrated model indicates that
there is at best limited scope for non-negligible spillovers between countries under any speci￿cation we
investigate. Moreover, we show in a separate exercise that the ￿scal devaluation channel disappears
if the additional indirect tax revenues are used to increase government expenditures rather than to
lower direct taxes.
Key features of the model are as follows. To allow for non-trivial price-setting decisions of ￿rms, pro-
duction in both countries is characterised by Dixit-Stiglitz-type monopolistic competition. Monetary
policy has a meaningful stabilisation role because of nominal price rigidities, in line with New Keyne-
sian reasoning (see Calvo (1983), Clarida et al. (1999), and Woodford (2003)). Moreover, monetary
policy is supranational and follows a Taylor-type feedback rule, targeting union-wide variables. By
contrast, ￿scal policy is country-speci￿c, and government expenditures and interest payments on out-
standing government debt can be ￿nanced through a linear (and non-discriminating) consumption tax
or a linear tax on labour income (with labour being the only factor of production). Fiscal policymak-
ers follow feedback rules which anchor the economies at country-speci￿c target levels of government
debt, similar to Leeper (1991), Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007) and Leith and von Thadden (2008).
Each country is specialised in the production of a composite tradeable good which is consumed in
both countries. Firms set identical producer prices in both countries and the terms of trade (i.e. the
producer price ratio between the two composite tradeable goods) depend in general equilibrium, inter
alia, on the structure of taxes and government expenditures in the two countries. The two countries
may be of di⁄erent relative size, measured in terms of the share of goods produced in a country, hold-
ing constant the total number of goods produced in the monetary union. Finally, we assume complete
asset markets between the two countries such that net foreign asset movements play no role.
Within this broad set-up, we assume ￿rst that the ￿ home￿country changes its long-run ￿scal priorities
and decides once and for all, at unchanged government expenditures, to permanently increase its con-
sumption tax. In line with the ￿scal devaluation hypothesis, the additional consumption tax revenues
are used to reduce the labour tax such that the home country￿ s long-run level of real government debt
stays unchanged, consistent with the target level. The ￿ foreign￿country does not have actively any
intention to change its taxes and government spending levels, but, to keep its own level of real debt
on target, it reacts passively by adjusting its labour tax. In sum, the consumption tax changes only
in the home country, while labour taxes adjust endogenously in both countries.
To summarise the results of this experiment, it is convenient to distinguish between long-run e⁄ects
(pertaining to steady-state comparisons) and short-run e⁄ects (pertaining to the transitional dynamics
between steady states). The tax shift leads to a long-run increase in the terms of trade (indicating the
improved competitiveness of the home economy), ensuring that home output rises, while foreign output
declines. Moreover, re￿ ecting changes in consumer prices (which include consumption taxes) as well as
the role of complete asset markets, home consumption decreases, while foreign consumption increases.5
As a general feature, within our model the strength of the terms of trade channel on home variables
decreases in the relative size of the home country. In other words, as the home country becomes small,
this strengthens the e⁄ects of the ￿scal devaluation channel on home consumption and output levels,
indicating that under Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition the price setting power of a country does
not vanish as a country becomes small. Quantitatively, for our symmetric benchmark calibration of
two equally sized countries exhibiting some home bias (such that home (foreign) produced goods make
up 75% of home (foreign) consumed goods) long-run spillovers between countries are limited, but not
5For a thorough analysis of patterns in which, because of the terms of trade channel, output e⁄ects between countries
are of the beggar-thy-neighbour type, while consumption e⁄ects are beggar-thyself, see Corsetti and Pesenti (2001).9
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entirely negligible, i.e. a permanent increase in the home consumption tax by 1pp decreases foreign
output in the long-run by 0.11%, while home output rises by 0.15 %. From a short-run perspective, all
e⁄ects (within and between countries) are shown to depend on a number of additional channels which
we discuss in isolated experiments. Speci￿cally, depending on whether i) the compensating decline
in the labour tax allows for a permanently balanced budget or temporary budget imbalances, ii) the
central bank￿ s objective is speci￿ed in terms of pre-tax or after-tax consumer price in￿ ation, and iii) the
tax shift is anticipated by the private sector or not, short-run dynamics exhibit signi￿cant di⁄erences.
For the particular combination of permanently balanced budgets, an in￿ ation objective in terms of pre-
tax consumer prices and a non-anticipated tax shift our analysis reveals that the central bank may not
face any aggregate (pre-tax) in￿ ationary pressure (because of o⁄setting de￿ ationary and in￿ ationary
impact e⁄ects in the home and foreign country, respectively) such that union-wide monetary policy
remains neutral with respect to the ￿scal reform in the home country. However, departures from
these particular assumptions lead to less symmetric constellations in which the feedback of union-wide
monetary policy matters for the pattern of short-run dynamics in both countries.
We then compare these results with a second, separate tax change scenario in which the home coun-
try permanently increases its consumption tax to ￿nance additional government expenditures at un-
changed direct taxes. Ceteris paribus, in this second scenario the consumption tax changes only in the
home country, while government expenditures adjust in both countries such that the long-run levels
of government debt remain unchanged at constant labour tax rates. As we discuss in detail in Section
6, this scenario no longer supports the ￿scal devaluation channel and leads to distinctly di⁄erent long-
run e⁄ects and transitional dynamics.6 In short, this scenario serves the purpose to illustrate that it
is impossible to assess the e⁄ects of an increase in the consumption tax in isolation, i.e. without a
comprehensive description of the ￿scal environment in which the tax change takes place.
It is worth stressing that our analysis is exclusively concerned with positive implications of ￿scal
reforms undertaken in the home country. Hence, we do not address strategic aspects of optimal mon-
etary and ￿scal policies in monetary unions, as explored, for example, by Lombardo and Sutherland
(2004), Beetsma and Jensen (2005), Ferrero (2009), and Gali and Monacelli (2008). In particular, the
beggar-thy-neighbour-type output e⁄ects of the ￿scal devaluation hypothesis would be counteracted
in (cooperative or non-cooperative) optimal policy settings in which both countries are allowed to
choose optimal actions. In line with our positive approach, Roeger and in￿ t Veld (2006) and European
Commission (2008), using a richer model structure, assess quantitatively the e⁄ects of unilateral tax
shifts towards indirect taxation within EMU. The order of magnitude of long-run output e⁄ects is
similar to our benchmark ￿ndings. Yet, as discussed in more detail in Section 4 (together with further
contributions from the literature), the role of the terms of trade is less important and, di⁄erently from
the focus of our paper, these studies do not address in analytical detail the open-economy dimension
of unilateral tax shifts. More closely related to our monetary union set-up, Duarte and Wolman (2008)
explore the ability of national ￿scal policies to reduce in￿ ation di⁄erentials with respect to union-wide
average in￿ ation. However, the paper focuses on the design of systematic ￿scal stabilisation rules in a
business cycle context (and not on the e⁄ects of lasting changes in tax structures which are the focus
of our paper).7 Coenen et al. (2008) use a large scale two-country model to investigate systematic
e⁄ects of tax reforms for the euro area as a whole, focusing on tax-related labour market distortions
6The very di⁄erent dynamics of the two experiments have counterparts in the closed-economy literature on balanced-
budget rules. Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (1997), Guo and Harrison (2004), and Giannitsarou (2007) show that stability and
determinacy requirements di⁄er signi￿cantly, depending on whether budget balance is achieved by labour or consumption
taxes or by government spending adjustments.
7Canzoneri et al. (2005) develop a monetary union model which allows for countries of di⁄erent size and asymmetric
￿scal positions, in line with stylised features of euro area countries. The paper argues that ￿scal shocks, compared with
other shocks, are relatively unimportant for the explanation of in￿ ation di⁄erentials in the euro area. Di⁄erently from
our paper, however, the paper does not investigate systematic e⁄ects of country-speci￿c changes in ￿scal policy.10
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in the euro area relative to the US economy. However, the focus is on international spillovers, while,
by construction, there is no scope for spillovers between euro area countries.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the model. Section 3 presents the benchmark
calibration. Sections 4 and 5 discuss long-run and short-run e⁄ects, respectively, of a tax shift in
the home country, in line with the ￿scal devaluation hypothesis. Section 6 discusses the second
experiment of a consumption tax ￿nanced increase in home government expenditures. Section 7
concludes. Technical material as well as various impulse response ￿gures are displayed in the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider a small-scale model of a monetary union which consists of two countries, similar to
Benigno (2004), Duarte and Wolman (2008), and Ferrero (2009). For convenience we label these
two countries as ￿ home￿and ￿ foreign￿ . Fiscal policy is country-speci￿c. By contrast, monetary policy
is supranational and the common central bank targets union-wide variables. The two economies are
structurally identical, but we allow for di⁄erences in size. The description of the model economy, unless
explicitly needed, is kept short since most of the assumed New Keynesian open economy features are
standard (see, in particular, Obstfeld and Rogo⁄, 1996). We treat in the following the home country
as the representative one to avoid duplication of notation whenever possible.
2.1 Consumers
The monetary union consists of a measure one of consumers of which [0;n) belong to the home country
and [n;1] to the foreign country. Each of the two countries produces a composite tradeable good. The
two composite goods consist of di⁄erentiated home tradeable goods, indexed on the interval [0;n); and
foreign tradeable goods, indexed on the interval [n;1]; respectively. Hence, the parameter n measures
the size of the home country both in terms of population size and in terms of the share of produced
goods. Home and foreign consumers are in￿nitely lived. In each country, consumers demand a mix of
home and foreign produced tradeable goods which enter an aggregate consumption index as described
below. Let Ct and Lt denote private consumption and the labour supply of the representative home





￿t [U (Ct) ￿ V (Lt)]
)
; (1)
where E0 denotes the expectation conditional on the information set at date t = 0, ￿ is the intertem-
poral discount factor (with 0 < ￿ < 1) and U and V denote the ￿ ow utilities from consumption
and labour, assumed to be additively separable. The home consumption index Ct; made up of home

















where ￿ > 0 denotes the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods and ￿ represents
the share of home goods in the basket of home consumers if the prices of CH;t and CF;t are equal.
8In order to have a well de￿ned maximisation problem we assume that U is twice continously di⁄erentiable, increasing
and concave in Ct; while V is twice continously di⁄erentiable, increasing and convex in Lt. For the speci￿c functional
forms, see Section 2.6.11
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Moreover, let ￿ = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ n)￿; where ￿ 2 (0;1] denotes the degree of openness of the home country.


















where ￿￿ = n￿￿ relates to the share of home goods in the basket of foreign consumers and ￿￿ 2 (0;1]
denotes the degree of openness of the foreign economy. In the benchmark calibration reported below we
allow for home bias, i.e. home consumers demand relatively more home goods than foreign consumers
and vice versa, implying ￿ > ￿￿: The variables Cj and Cj￿ (where j = H;H￿ and j￿ = F;F￿) are




































where ￿ > 1; ￿￿ > 1 denote the constant elasticities of substitution between the components in each




















































Firms are assumed to charge identical producer prices in the two countries (pH;t (h) = pH￿;t (h) ￿ pt(h)
and pF;t (f) = pF￿;t (f) ￿ pt(f)), i.e. the law of one price holds at the producer price level such that
PH;t = PH￿;t and PF;t = PF￿;t: Let the real exchange rate be de￿ned as RSt =
P￿
t
Pt : Then, in the
presence of home bias, purchasing power parity does not hold (Pt 6= P￿
t ) and the real exchange rate
may ￿ uctuate over time. Moreover, we de￿ne the terms of trade as Tt =
PF;t
PH;t.
In line with Duarte and Wolman (2008), we assume that consumers have access to a complete set of
state-contingent claims traded between home and foreign consumers (in equilibrium restricted to be in
zero net supply), ensuring thereby that net foreign asset movements play no role in the transmission
of shocks.9 Consumers also hold riskless nominal government bonds. Moreover, consumers own the
￿rms of their own country. In sum, the representative consumer of the home country faces in period

















t , and ￿C
t denote the nominal wage, the labour tax rate and the consumption tax rate,
respectively. ￿t(h) represents the nominal pro￿t of home ￿rm h, while BH;t￿1 denotes one￿ period
9For details on this and discussions of di⁄erences between complete and incomplete market structures, see, for example,
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) and Ghironi (2006).12
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home government bonds (purchased in period t￿1 and redeemed in period t); measured in per-capita
terms. Moreover, Rt￿1 = 1+it￿1 denotes the nominal interest factor paid on these bonds in period t,
respectively.10 Finally, Dt represents the consumer￿ s nominal state-contingent payo⁄s in period t (on
a portfolio chosen in period t ￿ 1); while Qt;t+1 denotes the stochastic discount factor for one-period
ahead nominal payo⁄s which is relevant for the home consumer in choosing his portfolio in period t:
A similar budget constraint applies for consumers in the foreign country. In both countries consumers
face no-Ponzi restrictions. For simplicity, we assume that both economies operate at the cashless limit.
The nominal interest rate is de￿ned as the price of the portfolio which delivers one unit of currency




In sum, the optimisation problem of the home consumer amounts to choose paths of private consump-
tion (Ct), labour supply (Lt), state contingent claims (Dt+1) and government bonds (BH;t) in order
to maximise (1) subject to the budget constraint (4), 8t > 0.
The solution to this problem is characterised by a number of well-known ￿rst-order conditions, describ-
ing optimal consumer behaviour. Intertemporal optimality of portfolio decisions leads to the following





























The assumption of complete asset markets in this setting ensures that the marginal rates of substitution
in consumption are equalised between countries in all states and at all times in nominal terms (after




































where the parameter ￿ > 0 depends on the initial wealth distribution, measured in terms of after-
tax consumer prices. This relationship implies that in all states and at all times there is a strong
correlation between home and foreign private consumption. In particular, in the absence of home bias
and assuming identical consumption tax rates, per capita consumption levels will be equalised in both













t ) captures the relevant tax wedge for the labour-consumption trade-o⁄. Finally,
let GH;t and GF;t denote the (per capita) levels of composite government expenditures in the two
10One could assume, more generally, that home consumers can also hold riskless foreign government bonds BF;t￿1
(paying the same nominal equilibrium interest factor Rt￿1), and vice versa, as considered by Duarte and Wolman (2008).
Given the supply of government bonds introduced below, this would a⁄ect none of our results.13
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countries. As concerns the composition of these goods in terms of individual components, we assume
perfect home bias for government expenditures. Combined with optimal consumer behaviour, this


















































where YH;t and YF;t denote per capita levels of composite home and foreign output, respectively.
2.2 Firms
Output markets are subject to monopolistic competition, while labour markets (with labour being
the only production input) are perfectively competitive within each of the two countries. Labour is
immobile between the two countries. Consider the home country. Let AH;t denote the home level
of labour productivity (assumed, for simplicity, to be identical across home sectors). Output of the
representative home ￿rm h is produced according to the linear production function
yt(h) = AH;tLt(h) (11)
where Lt(h) denotes the labour input used by ￿rm h. Notice that competitive equilibria (as further




0 Lt (h)dh; since both workers and ￿rms are of measure n: Nominal
wages are taken as given by the representative ￿rm such that nominal marginal costs are identical for





The price-setting of ￿rms is in line with Calvo (1983). Each period a fraction (1￿￿) of ￿rms has the
chance to reset prices in an optimal manner, implying that PH;t follows the law of motion
P1￿￿
H;t = ￿(PH;t￿1)1￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(e pt(h))1￿￿;
where e pt(h) denotes the optimal price chosen by home ￿rms in period t which have the chance to






(￿)sQt;t+s [pt(h) ￿ MCH;t+s]yt:t+s(h)






where yt:t+s(h) denotes the demand for good h at time (t+s); conditional on keeping the price pt(h) for
s periods ￿xed at the level chosen at time t: The solution of the maximisation problem is characterised



































represents real marginal costs in period t, expressed in terms of home producer prices, and where
(5) has been used to substitute out for the Qt;t+s￿terms. Notice that under ￿ exible price setting










Analogous expressions can be derived for the foreign country.
2.3 Fiscal policies
The ￿scal authority in the home country issues one-period nominal debt (BH;t) and taxes home labour
income at rate ￿L
t and home private consumption expenditures at rate ￿C
t ; respectively. Revenues are
spent on home government expenditures GH;t (exhibiting perfect home bias) and interest payments on
outstanding debt, issued in the previous period.11 Hence, the home country￿ s ￿ ow government budget
constraint in nominal terms (and on a per capita basis) is given by
BH;t = Rt￿1BH;t￿1 ￿ sH;t;
with the nominal primary surplus (sH;t) being de￿ned as
sH;t = ￿L
t WH;tLt + ￿C
t PtCt ￿ PH;tGH;t:
To rewrite these two equations in real terms let Rr
H;t￿1 = Rt￿1Pt￿1=Pt denote the real interest factor
and use Br
H;t = BH;t=Pt; sr













with analogous equations holding for the foreign country. Notice that the primary surplus depends
on three separate ￿scal instruments (￿L
t ;￿C
t ;GH;t), allowing, in principle, for a large range of ￿scal
scenarios to be studied.
2.3.1 Benchmark speci￿cation of ￿scal policy
We use this broad set-up to explore the e⁄ects of permanent and unilateral changes in the home con-
sumption tax on home and foreign variables in a number of distinct general equilibrium scenarios. Our
benchmark scenario exhibits two particular assumptions, in line with the ￿scal devaluation hypothesis.
First, in response to the change in the home consumption tax by ￿￿C both ￿scal authorities keep
their budgets permanently balanced in real terms, ensuring that the real debt levels in both countries




F for all t: For given target levels of real










11For simplicity, it is assumed that government expenditures do not enter the preferences of households. Yet, none of
our results would change if government expenditures entered preferences in an additively separable manner.15
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Second, our benchmark assumes that budget balance is achieved by adjustments in labour taxes. In
other words, in response to the permanent change in ￿C by ￿￿C; we treat ￿L
t and ￿L￿
t as the residual
instruments which ensure that (13) is satis￿ed, taking as given GH and GF (which are held constant at
their steady-state values). These two assumptions imply for ￿L
t and ￿L￿























Both benchmark assumptions will be relaxed subsequently below. In Section 5:2; when discussing
short-run features of the ￿scal devaluation hypothesis, we relax the balanced-budget requirement and
allow for temporary imbalances in real government debt (maintaining, however, that labour taxes are
the instruments to ultimately stabilise the economies at unchanged long-run debt levels). In Section 6
we consider a separate tax change scenario which satis￿es the balanced-budget requirement, assuming,
however, that government expenditures are the residual instruments (at constant labour taxes).
2.4 Monetary policy
Because of nominal price stickiness, there is a stabilisation role for monetary policy. The central
bank runs a common monetary policy for the two countries, responding only to aggregate union-wide
variables. To this end, the central bank follows a New Keynesian interest rate feedback rule









(1 + i); (15)
where i denotes the steady-state nominal interest rate, while ￿yu and ￿￿u denote the feedback coe¢ -
cients associated with the union-wide output gap (with YU;t and Y n
U;t denoting the current union-wide
output level and the natural union-wide output level under ￿ exible prices, respectively) and pre-tax
union-wide consumer price in￿ ation (￿U;t) in deviation from the target rate ￿U; normalised to ￿U = 1:
Moreover, to allow for interest rate smoothing we assume
(1 + it) = (1 +e it)1￿￿(1 + it￿1)￿;
where ￿ 2 (0;1) captures the degree of interest rate smoothing. Union-wide real output YU;t is obtained
from the corresponding values of union-wide nominal output
nPH;tYH;t + (1 ￿ n)PF;tYF;t = PU;tYU;t;;
and the de￿ ator PU;t corresponds to the pre-tax union-wide consumer price level (i.e. net of consump-
tion taxes), PU;t = sCPt + (1 ￿ sC)P￿
t ; where sC = nPC
nPC+(1￿n)P￿C￿ denotes the steady-state share
of the home country in union-wide nominal consumption. Because of ￿U;t = PU;t=PU;t￿1 the central
bank￿ s in￿ ation objective in our benchmark speci￿cation is based on the index PU;t which measures
pre-tax consumer prices. However, this assumption is not without alternatives, as further discussed
below in subsection 5:3:
2.5 Price levels and real wages: some de￿nitions
2.5.1 Price level de￿nitions
This subsection summarises compactly the di⁄erent price level de￿nitions (and short-cuts) which will
be used in the remainder of this paper:16
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(i) PH;t : producer price level of the (composite) home produced good, for short: home producer price
level.
(ii) Pt : consumer price level prevailing in the home country net of the home consumption tax, for
short: pre-tax home consumer price level.
(iii) PU;t : union-wide consumer price level net of consumption taxes, for short: pre-tax union-wide
consumer price level, with PU;t = sCPt + (1 ￿ sC)P￿
t ; sC = nPC
nPC+(1￿n)P￿C￿ and the corresponding
in￿ ation measure ￿U;t = PU;t=PU;t￿1:
(iv) (1 + ￿C
t )Pt : consumer price level prevailing in the home country including home consumption
taxes, for short: after-tax home consumer price level.
(v) P￿C
U;t : union-wide consumer price level including consumption taxes of both countries, for short:
after-tax union-wide consumer price level, with P￿C
U;t = s￿C
C (1 + ￿C
t )Pt + (1 ￿ s￿C









2.5.2 Real wage de￿nitions
As indicated by the notation introduced above, we consider symmetric equilibria across households


















H;t denote the real producer and real consumer wage in the home country, respec-




































In general equilibrium, the decisions of households and ￿rms need to be individually optimal and
consistent with each other at the aggregate level, taking as given the behaviour of monetary and
￿scal policymakers and the evolution of exogenous shock processes. In principle, the model could be
used to analyse the e⁄ects of a broad range of shocks. However, we focus exclusively on the ￿scal
experiments mentioned above, i.e. we abstract from productivity shocks (and assume, for simplicity,
AH;t = AF;t = 1;8t > 0) and refrain from the speci￿cation of any other shock processes.
Our analysis of competitive equilibria proceeds in two steps. First, for a given vector of constant
policy variables, we solve for the unique symmetric steady-state equilibrium, as discussed in the next
subsection. Second, starting out from this initial steady state, we consider a permanent change in
￿C by ￿￿C and discuss in separate sections long- and short-run responses of the model economy to
this change. The long-run analysis compares the new and the initial steady state from a comparative
statics perspective, while the short-run analysis addresses properties of the transitory dynamics, using
a log-linearised version of the model (which is summarised in the Appendix).17
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2.6.1 Steady states
Let variables without time index denote steady-state values. For simple tractability, we consider from
now onwards the speci￿c functional forms U (C) = 1
1￿￿C1￿￿ and V (L) = 1
1+￿L1+￿, with ￿ > 0 and
￿ > 0 denoting the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and of the
Frisch elasticity of labour supply, respectively. Notice that (12) implies MCr
H = ￿￿1
￿ : Moreover, (5)
and (6) imply Qt;t+1 = Q￿




PF = 1. Finally, we de￿ne PH
P ￿ pH and PF
P￿ ￿ pF:
Then, using (11) and (16), the steady-state counterparts of (2), (3), (7), (8), (9) and (10) for both
countries can be compactly summarised as the following system of nine equations in the nine unknowns
YH; YF; C; C￿; pH; pF, ￿L; ￿L￿;RS; taking as given constant values of the ￿scal variables Br
H; Br
F;
￿C, ￿C￿; GH; GF:
YH = p
￿￿
H ￿C + GH + p
￿￿￿
H RS￿￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ n)
n
C￿ (17)
YF = (pFRS)￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)n
1 ￿ n
C + GF + (pF)￿￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿￿)C￿ (18)











(C￿)￿￿￿ = ￿RS￿1 1 + ￿C
1 + ￿C￿ (21)
1 = ￿p
1￿￿
H + (1 ￿ ￿)(pFRS)1￿￿ (22)
1 = ￿￿(pHRS￿1)1￿￿￿



























￿￿ pFYF + ￿C￿C￿ ￿ pFGF
￿
(25)
Below we solve numerically a calibrated version of this system for the nine unknowns, and, using
these numbers, it is straightforward to back out the steady-state values of the remaining endogenous
variables. In particular, the steady-state terms of trade can be calculated from T = RSpF=pH:
3 Calibration of the benchmark monetary union with countries of
equal size and symmetric home bias
This section summarises our benchmark calibration which considers a monetary union in which the
two countries are assumed to have equal size (n = 0:5) and a symmetric home bias because of ￿ = 0:5.
We calibrate the model using aggregate euro area data, with a quarterly frequency. Both countries
are characterised by identical structural parameters (as summarised in Table 1), which are chosen
in line with related literature: The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set to 0:5 (i.e. ￿ = 2);
as in Stockman and Tesar (1995). The labour supply elasticity is chosen to be 0:4 (i.e. ￿ = 2:5);
striking a balance between micro data evidence and macro aspects, in line with the DSGE literature
concerned with the euro area (e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003), Altissimo et al. (2005), Coenen et
al. (2008), Christiano et al. (2008)). The discount factor equals ￿ = 0:99; implying an annual
interest rate of around four percent. As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Altissimo et al.18
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(2005), the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erentiated goods within countries is assumed to be
￿ = 7:88; consistent with a steady-state markup of 15%. The elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods is set as ￿ = 1:5 (as in Altissimo et al. (2005) and Chari et al. (2002)). Since
this intratemporal elasticity of substitution is higher than the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(i.e. ￿ > 1
￿), home and foreign goods are substitutes in the preferences of agents. Like Duarte and
Wolman (2008), the degree of openness in both countries equals ￿ = 0:5; implying an import share
of 25% in the consumption basket. The Calvo parameter, which ￿xes the share of ￿rms that cannot
change prices every quarter, is assumed to be ￿ = 0:85; implying that the average duration between
price adjustments is 11 months. This value is somewhat higher than the estimated values found in
micro studies for euro area countries, but in line with the values chosen by Smets and Wouters (2003)
and Coenen et al. (2008).
Table 1: Structural parameters
Size of the (home) country n 0.5
Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ￿ 2
Inverse of the labour supply elasticity ￿ 2.5
Discount factor ￿ 0.99
Elasticity of substitution between goods within countries ￿ 7.88
Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods ￿ 1.5
Degree of openness ￿ 0.5
Degree of nominal price stickiness ￿ 0.85
Table 2 summarises the ￿scal policy values which were used to calibrate the initial steady state,
assumed to be identical for both countries. The consumption and labour tax rates as well as the
debt-output ratio have been set at values which are roughly in line with average euro area data (see
Table A.1. in the Appendix) and consistent with related literature. Notice that the assumed value
of the debt-output ratio corresponds to a value of 66% in annualised terms, while the government
expenditure share is residually determined by the steady-state government budget constraint.12
Table 2: Fiscal characteristics of the initial steady state
Consumption tax rate ￿C = ￿C￿ 0.15
Labour tax rate ￿L = ￿L￿ 0.30
Share of government expenditures in output dGH = GH
YH = dGF = GF
YF 0.33
Debt-output ratio bH = BH
PHYH = bF = BF
PFYF 2.64
Table 3 summarises the parameter values used for the monetary policy rule. Following the DSGE
literature concerned with the euro area, the rule is characterised by a large smoothing parameter, i.e.
the coe¢ cient on the lagged interest rate is set equal to ￿ = 0:95. Moreover, the benchmark response
coe¢ cient to in￿ ation is set equal to ￿￿u = 2; while we assume that monetary policy does not respond
12A more detailed matching of all aspects of ￿scal data would require a richer speci￿cation of government activities
which is beyond the scope of this paper. In particular, our model does not allow for public transfers and investment,
implying that the residually determined share of government expenditures is too high compared with the data. Moreover,
the labour tax rate is too low if one looks at the combined numbers for labour taxes and social contribution rates (as
reported, for example, in Coenen et al (2008). For numerical choices similar to ours in small scale DSGE models, see
Ferrero (2007) and Canzoneri et al (2005).19
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to output ￿ uctuations (￿yu = 0).13 Notice that the benchmark balanced-budget rule (14) does not
require any additional ￿scal parameter.
Table 3: Parameters of monetary policy rule
Response parameter of monetary policy to union output gap ￿yu 0
Response parameter of monetary policy to union in￿ ation ￿￿u 2
Smoothing parameter ￿ 0:95
4 Long-run e⁄ects of a permanent shift in the tax structure of the
home country from direct towards indirect taxes
This section focuses on long-run e⁄ects of a permanent shift in the tax structure of a union member
country, abstracting from the transitory dynamics induced by the short-run monetary and ￿scal feed-
backs. Speci￿cally, to address the ￿scal devaluation hypothesis, it is assumed that the home country
permanently increases its consumption tax by 1 pp from 15% to 16% (i.e. ￿￿C = 0:01) and uses the
additional revenues to ￿nance a permanent cut in the labour tax rate such that the home country￿ s
long-run level of real government debt stays unchanged, holding constant government expenditures.
The foreign country does not have actively any intention to change its tax structure, but, to keep its
own level of real debt on target, it reacts passively by adjusting its labour tax rate at unchanged gov-
ernment expenditures. In sum, the consumption tax changes only in the home country, while labour
taxes adjust endogenously in both countries, in line with (14).
Table 4 summarises the long-run e⁄ects for key real variables of the two countries. The table covers
the benchmark ￿ monetary union with countries of equal size and symmetric home bias￿(as summarised
in Section 3), but also a number of alternative monetary unions speci￿cations. These speci￿cations
di⁄er from the benchmark, ceteris paribus, in terms of i) the size of the two countries (captured by n)
and ii) the strength of the home bias (captured by ￿), while otherwise the calibration is identical to
Section 3. To allow for variation along these two dimensions facilitates the identi￿cation of the core
general equilibrium channels which are of relevance for the benchmark monetary union.
All these speci￿cations have in common that the driving force behind the shift in the tax structure
of the home country from direct towards indirect taxes is the following clear-cut di⁄erence between
the two considered tax instruments: The home consumption tax a⁄ects the entire consumption of the
home country, irrespective of whether the consumption goods have been produced at home or in the
foreign country. By contrast, the home labour tax a⁄ects the entire production of the home country,
irrespective of whether the produced output is sold at home or in the foreign country. Hence, the
change in the tax structure of the home country from direct to indirect taxes tends to favour home
production relative to home consumption. Since the terms of trade are endogenously determined, this
feature has signi￿cant implications for the two countries in our model. However, to establish a clear
reference point, we discuss ￿rst the degenerate case of a monetary union which consists only of the
home economy, i.e. by considering n ! 1 our discussion starts out from a closed economy scenario.
4.1 Closed economy
For the special case of a closed economy (column 1 in Table 4), the two taxes have very similar
steady-state e⁄ects under the particular assumptions of our set-up, in which labour is the only input
for production and all tax schedules are linear. This ￿nding can be readily reconciled with well-
13For a discussion of this assumption, see Secton 5.1.20
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known channels as summarised, for example, in Layard et al. (1996), Bovenberg (2006), and European
Commission (2008). Speci￿cally, in order for a revenue-neutral shift from labour taxes to indirect taxes
to be able to increase output and employment it is crucial that this shift reduces the e⁄ective tax burden
on labour. Given our simplifying assumption of linear tax schedules, this in turn requires that the
share of non-labour income (related, in particular, to non-indexed unemployment bene￿ts and pensions
as well as capital income) is su¢ ciently large.14 However, under our modelling assumptions (which
abstract from unemployment, life-cycle behaviour and capital accumulation) the only alternatives to
labour income are pure pro￿t income and interest income on predetermined bond holdings, and both
of these items are quantitatively small. Because of these features, there is, by construction, little
scope for signi￿cant real e⁄ects of the considered change in the tax structure. Under our calibration,
a permanent increase of the consumption tax by 1 pp from 15% to 16% leads to a decline in the
labour tax by 0.76 pp from 30% to 29.24%. The implied increase in output (which is proportional to
employment) and consumption by 0.05% and 0.04%, respectively, is very small, indicating that under
our modelling assumptions in the special scenario of a closed economy the consumption tax is only
marginally less distortionary in the initial steady state than the labour tax.
Table 4 : Long-run e⁄ects of a permanent shift in the home tax structure, percentage changes
Closed economy Monetary union
benchmark
Home bias ￿ no home bias (￿ = 1) home bias (￿ = 0:5)
Country size n = 1 n = 0:75 n = 0:5 n = 0:1 n = 0:5
Change in ￿C in pp 1 1 1 1 1
Change in ￿L in pp ￿0:76 ￿0:75 ￿0:73 ￿0:71 ￿0:74
Change in ￿C￿ in pp ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Change in ￿L￿ in pp ￿ ￿0:05 ￿0:03 ￿0:01 ￿0:02
Terms of trade ￿ 0:21 0:21 0:21 0:38
Real exchange rate ￿ 0 0 0 0:19
Home consumption 0:04 ￿0:07 ￿0:19 ￿0:38 ￿0:14
Home output 0:05 0:12 0:18 0:29 0:15
Home consumer real wage 0:21 0:13 0:06 ￿0:06 0:08
Foreign consumption ￿ 0:36 0:25 0:06 0:20
Foreign output ￿ ￿0:20 ￿0:13 ￿0:03 ￿0:11
Foreign consumer real wage ￿ 0:21 0:13 0:02 0:11
Change in bH in pp ￿0:13 ￿0:16 ￿0:2 ￿0:26 ￿0:15
Change in bF in pp ￿ 0:12 0:08 0:02 0:03
4.2 Monetary union with countries of equal size (no home bias)
In a monetary union of two equally sized countries with no home bias (column 3 in Table 4), the shift
in the tax structure of the home country towards indirect taxation has more signi￿cant e⁄ects on real
14In this spirit, bene￿ts from redirecting the tax structure towards consumption taxes are substantially larger in full-
￿ edged dynamic settings with capital accumulation. In such environments, consumption taxes act implicitly as e¢ cient
taxes on the inelastically supplied, predetermined capital stock, as discussed and quantitatively explored in Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1972), Cooley and Hansen (1992), Mendoza and Tesar (1998), and Coleman (2001).21
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variables, a⁄ecting both countries. In particular, this shift ensures that domestic producers bene￿t
from a cost advantage relative to their foreign competitors, leading to a long-run increase in the terms
of trade. This change in the terms of trade is responsible for two spillover e⁄ects which are absent
in the closed economy scenario. First, re￿ ecting the relative improvement in the competitiveness of
home production, home output increases, while foreign output decreases. Since the law of one price
holds consumers in both countries support this reallocation of production by switching their relative
consumption structure towards home goods. Second, the terms of trade channel hurts home consumers.
While home consumers bear the burden of the higher consumption tax, they do not fully reap the
bene￿ts of the compensating tax measure, i.e. they ￿ share￿with foreign consumers the bene￿ts of a










￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)T1￿￿
i 1





Compared with the closed economy, for any given change in ￿L and ￿C and any given increase in home
output; the new real consumer wage will be smaller in the open economy because of the terms of trade
increase, implying, ceteris paribus, a decline in home consumption. Moreover, this mechanism ensures,
when combined with the complete asset market condition (7), that foreign consumption increases.
In sum, the terms of trade channel drives a certain wedge between consumption and production in
the two countries. In absolute terms, the e⁄ects are small, but not entirely negligible, as evidenced
by the terms of trade increase by 0.21%. This terms of trade e⁄ect (which is at the heart of the ￿scal
devaluation hypothesis) ensures that home output increases by 0.18% (which is about four times the
e⁄ect of the closed economy), while home consumption decreases by 0.19% (i.e. the terms of trade
e⁄ect dominates the consumption increase reported for the closed economy). Moreover, with foreign
output decreasing by 0.13% and foreign consumption increasing by 0.25%, the terms of trade channel
generates limited, but non-negligible spillovers.
To conclude this subsection it is worth stressing that, since the terms of trade are endogenous, one may
argue that it can be a bit misleading if we talk in the following repeatedly about ￿ terms of trade e⁄ects￿ .
Evidently, the strength of these e⁄ects depends on all structural features of the model economy (like
the pricing strategies of ￿rms, labour market assumptions etc.), and the e⁄ects are particularly strong
under the assumption of complete asset markets. Yet, lacking a better alternative, we refer to these
e⁄ects as a short-cut that captures all model-speci￿c open-economy aspects which make the analysis
di⁄erent from a closed economy model.15
4.3 Monetary unions with countries of di⁄erent size (no home bias)
The results established so far can be generalised if one looks at monetary unions consisting of countries
of di⁄erent size (and no home bias). To this end, columns 2 and 4 in Table 4 report also results for a
￿ large￿home country (n = 0:75) and a ￿ small￿home country (n = 0:1). Notice that the long-run change
in the terms of trade is independent of the size of the two countries. Moreover, it is straightforward
to verify that all the other long-run e⁄ects discussed so far are a monotonic function of the size
of the two countries. Hence, the reasoning given so far can be extended to two more general and
symmetric conclusions. As concerns the home country, the magnitude of the terms of trade related
e⁄ects on production, consumption and the real consumer wage decreases in the size of the home
country, i.e. the leverage of a change in the home tax structure on home variables is largest in the
case of a small home country. In other words, this ￿nding indicates that under Dixit-Stiglitz-type
monopolistic competition the price setting power of a country does not vanish as the country becomes
15For a model-based discussion of how the terms of trade channel depends on various structural features in open
economy models, see Lipinska et al (2009).22
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small, di⁄ering thereby from the textbook case of a small open economy, as discussed in Feldstein
and Krugman (1990). Similarly, as concerns the foreign country, the magnitude of the terms of trade
related e⁄ects on production, consumption and the real consumer wage decreases in the size of the
foreign country, i.e. the leverage of a change in the home tax structure on foreign variables is largest
in the case of a small foreign country.
These numerical ￿ndings re￿ ect a robust pattern of our model economy. To substantiate this claim, it
is instructive to analyse key equations which come from a ￿rst-order approximation of the equilibrium
conditions of the model. As derived in the Appendix, one can show that changes in the terms of trade
do not directly depend on changes in consumption taxes. Instead, they are entirely driven by changes
in labour tax rates:16
b Tt =
1
1 + ￿￿(dC + dC￿)
(wL￿
b ￿L￿
t ￿ wLb ￿L
t ): (26)
Because of the assumption of constant productivity levels, the home real producer wage stays constant
in the long run. By contrast, the home real consumer wage varies, depending on the changes in the





H;t = ￿(1 ￿ n)b Tt ￿ wCb ￿C
t ￿ wLb ￿L
t
While the change in the tax structure has a priori an ambiguous e⁄ect on the home real consumer wage,
Table 4 shows that for the special case of a closed economy the net e⁄ect is positive. As one moves
from this limiting scenario to ￿ proper￿monetary unions, the terms of trade e⁄ect becomes increasingly
important for the home real consumer wage, and home consumers are most strongly hurt in the case
of a small home economy (i.e. n being small). Extending this reasoning, the long-run e⁄ects for home
consumption and output can also be decomposed into changes in the two tax rates and the terms of
trade, i.e.
b Ct = ￿(1 ￿ n)
1 + ￿￿(dC + dC￿)









￿(dC + dC￿) + ￿
wLb ￿L
t (27)
b YH;t = (1 ￿ n)(￿￿ ￿ 1)
￿(dC + dC￿)








￿(dC + dC￿) + ￿
wLb ￿L
t :
Equations (27) and (28) reveal that the terms of trade e⁄ects on b Ct and b YH;t are largest in the case
of a small home economy. Moreover, the partial e⁄ects of b T; b ￿C
t ; and b ￿L
t on home consumption have
the same sign structure as established for the home real consumer wage. By contrast, the e⁄ect of
b T on home output is of opposite sign (i.e. positive) whenever ￿￿ > 1; in line with our calibration.
Hence, home output increases in the terms of trade if home and foreign goods are substitutes in the
preferences of agents, as discussed in Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Tille (2001).17














1￿￿L￿ ; dC =
nC
YH ; dC￿ =
(1￿n)C￿
YF :
17Evidently, b Ct and b YH;t can be entirely expressed as a function of tax-related terms if one uses (26) in (27) and (28),
as shown in the Appendix. However, to understand the special role played by the terms of trade, (27) and (28) o⁄er
more intuitive representations. Moreover, corresponding patterns can be established for the long-run e⁄ects on foreign
variables. In particular, the foreign real consumer wage can be decomposed as follows
b !
c









implying that the terms-of-trade e⁄ect on the foreign real consumer wage is of opposite sign (i.e. positive), and it can
be shown that the terms-of-trade e⁄ects on foreign consumption and foreign output are also of opposite sign.23
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4.4 Benchmark monetary union with countries of equal size and symmetric home
bias
Building on these insights it is straightforward to see how the results change if one considers a monetary
union with countries of equal size and symmetric home bias in consumption patterns, in line with the
calibration in Section 3: As one can infer from the last column in Table 4; the assumption of home bias
implies that the real exchange rate is no longer constant over time. Compared with column 3, this
feature dampens the long-run e⁄ects on home consumption and home output as well as the spillover
e⁄ects on foreign consumption and foreign output. In other words, the assumption of home bias
ensures that both economies are less exposed to the terms of trade related e⁄ects of the considered
change in the tax structure of the home economy. Quantitatively, however, this dampening e⁄ect is
negligible, i.e. the increase in home output (by 0.15%) and foreign consumption (by 0.20%) as well
as the decrease in home consumption (by 0.14%) and foreign output (by 0.11%) are only marginally
smaller than in the absence of home bias.
It is worth stressing that for all scenarios discussed in Table 4 the balanced-budget closure implies
that the debt-output-ratios (bH and bF) change in steady-state comparison (because of the changes
in the output levels). However, quantitatively the e⁄ects on the debt-output-ratios are very small.
Corresponding to this feature, we con￿rmed that all long-run patterns in Table 4 do not change if
the balanced-budget assumption is dropped and it is instead assumed that the labour tax rates are
changed such that the debt-output ratios in in the two countries remain at their initial levels. For the
short-run dynamics, however, the details of the ￿scal closure do matter, as we show below.
To conclude this section, we point out that the order of magnitude of the e⁄ects summarised in
Table 4, when appropriately normalised for the size of the tax changes, is similar to quantitative
￿ndings for tax reforms established in related papers. Yet, our particular focus on the terms of
trade channel within a monetary union in which all available taxes are assumed to be distortionary
makes some of the results somewhat special. Most closely related to this paper, Roeger and in￿ t
Veld (2006) and European Commission (2008, p. 199 ⁄.), when quantifying the e⁄ects of unilateral
tax shifts towards indirect taxation within EMU, obtain similar output e⁄ects for the home country.
Yet, in these studies, because of strong redistribution e⁄ects within countries and complementarities
between employment and capital formation, domestic demand e⁄ects are more pronounced than in our
analysis.18 Moreover, asset markets between countries are incomplete. These features ensure that the
terms of trade channel is of little importance, implying that there are virtually no long-run spillovers
between countries.19 Similarly, the reported long-run e⁄ects hardly depend on the relative size of the
countries. As concerns genuine open economy contributions, Mendoza and Tesar (1998), consider a
revenue-neutral replacement of US income taxes by consumption taxes in a framework which abstracts
from terms of trade e⁄ects. Instead, the output and consumption e⁄ects (which are larger than in
the also reported closed economy experiment) are attributed to smoothing and redistribution e⁄ects
via world capital markets. Coenen et al. (2008) use a large scale two-country model to investigate
systematic e⁄ects of tax reforms for the euro area as a whole, focusing on labour market distortions in
the euro area relative to the US. The paper considers a revenue-neutral change of consumption taxes
which is ￿nanced via compensating variations of lump-sum taxes. The latter feature leads to terms of
trade reactions which are di⁄erent from our paper and, similar to Mendoza and Tesar (1998), output
and consumption move in the same direction. While the paper establishes non-negligible international
18In particular, the tax reform shifts the tax burden from liquidity-constrained consumers with a high propensity to
consume towards unconstrained consumers (with unrestricted access to capital markets and, hence, to all non-labour
related income), triggering thereby signi￿cant demand e⁄ects in the home country.
19Consistent with these ￿ndings, we checked that in our model, under the extreme assumption of ￿nancial autarky,
the terms of trade channel loses signi￿cance and the e⁄ects become similar to the closed economy case.24
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spillovers, there is, by construction, no scope for spillovers between euro area countries.20
5 Short-run e⁄ects of a permanent shift in the tax structure of the
home country from direct towards indirect taxes
Re￿ ecting the assumption of nominal rigidities, the model implies that monetary policy is non-neutral
in the short run. Importantly, since monetary policy reacts to union-wide developments there is scope
for short-run interactions between the two countries which go beyond the long-run spillovers identi￿ed
in the previous Section. Moreover, short-run dynamics depend on the ￿scal feedback structure. To
characterise core features of the short-run dynamics in a tractable manner, this Section proceeds as
follows. Section 5:1 summarises the short-run dynamics of the benchmark speci￿cation introduced
above. We report then, as a robustness exercise, how these dynamics change under three distinct and
isolated experiments, each relaxing a di⁄erent characteristic feature of the benchmark. Section 5:2
considers an alternative ￿scal feedback rule which relaxes the balanced-budget requirement and allows
instead for a di⁄erent speed at which the compensating decline in direct taxes takes place. Section
5:3 considers short-run dynamics which result from the use of a di⁄erent target index of monetary
policy, holding the other features of the Taylor rule constant. In particular, Section 5:3 discusses
how the benchmark results of Section 5:1 change if monetary policy targets after-tax rather than
pre-tax union-wide consumer price in￿ ation. Finally, Section 5:4 discusses how the benchmark results
of Section 5:1 change if the change in the tax structure is no longer modelled as a genuine surprise,
but rather as a policy which is announced ahead and therefore anticipated by the private sector.
5.1 Benchmark monetary union with countries of equal size and symmetric home
bias
This subsection complements Subsection 4:4 and summarises main characteristics of the transitional
dynamics triggered by the unilateral shift in the tax structure of the home economy. In particular,
notwithstanding the above identi￿ed long-run changes in consumption and output both within and
between countries, these adjustments leave pre-tax union-wide CPI in￿ ation dynamics una⁄ected.
This implies that the home country can implement its reform of the tax structure without triggering
a reaction of the common monetary policy. As to be inferred from Figure 1 (bold lines), the logic
underlying this result can be summarised as follows.21 Consider ￿rst the variables of the home country.
Because of nominal price stickiness, the terms of trade increase relatively slowly over time before
reaching the new long-run level after about 20 quarters. Corresponding to this slow change in the
terms of trade, on impact home output increases less than in the long run. Notice that home output is
proportional to labour, implying that under the balanced-budget requirement the labour tax is bound
to decline slowly over time, i.e. on impact ￿L
t declines by less than in the long run. This in turn
implies that consumers, while facing immediately the once and for all increase in the consumption
tax, bene￿t from the compensating reduction of the labour tax only with a certain delay. Consistent
with this pattern, home consumption, home consumer real wages and home producer real wages all
decline on impact by more than in the long run. With the dynamics of home producer prices being
20See, in particular, Table 2 on p. 237 in Mendoza and Tesar (1998) and Column 1, Table 2 on p. 45 in Coenen et
al (2008), requiring scaling factors of around 40 and 10, respectively, to obtain dimensions for output and consumption
e⁄ects comparable with the numbers reported in our Table 4. Notice, however, that the very di⁄erent scale of the
considered tax changes in both papers makes comparisons questionable which do not allow explicitly for non-linearities.
21The impule responses in Figure 1 are based on a ￿rst-order approximation of the economy developed in Section 2:
The approximate long-run levels in Figure 1 are virtually identical to the exact values reported in column 5 in Table 1;
i.e. the approximation error is negligible.25
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driven by the New-Keynesian Phillips curve
b ￿H;t = kH d MC
r
H;t + ￿Etb ￿H;t+1 with: d MC
r
H;t = b w
p
H;t;
this implies that the change in the tax structure exerts on impact a de￿ ationary e⁄ect on home
producer prices. This de￿ ationary e⁄ect is very small, i.e. b ￿H;t drops on impact by about 5 basis
points. Irrespective of its small size, this e⁄ect is inconsequential for pre-tax union-wide in￿ ation
dynamics since it is o⁄set by an equally sized in￿ ationary e⁄ect on foreign producer prices. This latter
e⁄ect re￿ ects that short-run dynamics in the foreign country are the mirror image of developments in
the home country. In particular, the slow change in the terms of trade implies that foreign output is
on impact higher than in the long run. Similarly, foreign consumption is also on impact higher than in
the long run, in line with the complete asset market condition which establishes a crucial link between
the consumption levels of the two countries. In sum, these features generate in￿ ationary dynamics
of foreign producer prices which o⁄set the de￿ ationary dynamics of home producer prices. To see
this point in greater clarity, notice that pre-tax union-wide CPI in￿ ation dynamics are approximately
given by
b ￿U;t = sCb ￿t + (1 ￿ sC)b ￿￿
t;
with the country-speci￿c elements being given by
b ￿t = ￿b ￿H;t + (1 ￿ ￿)b ￿F;t
b ￿￿
t = ￿￿b ￿H;t + (1 ￿ ￿￿)b ￿F;t:
Our benchmark calibration of n = ￿ = 0:5 implies ￿ = 0:75 and ￿￿ = 0:25; while sC = 0:5: Hence,
b ￿U;t = 0:5b ￿H;t + 0:5b ￿F;t; implying that de￿ ationary and in￿ ationary producer price e⁄ects of equal
size in the two countries exactly o⁄set each other in terms of pre-tax union-wide CPI in￿ ation.
Because of this symmetric feature the nominal interest rate remains unchanged during the transition
period. In other words, the union-wide monetary policy remains entirely ￿ neutral￿with respect to the
unilateral change in the tax structure of the home country. Notice, however, that after-tax union-wide
CPI in￿ ation does re￿ ect the increase in consumption taxes of the home country. With the tax change
being modelled as a genuine surprise, with producer prices being largely predetermined, and with
monetary policy being unresponsive, the pass-through into after-tax consumer prices is on impact
virtually complete, i.e. after-tax union-wide CPI in￿ ation increases on impact by close to 50 basis
points, in line with the weight of 50% in b ￿U
t carried by the home country.22
To conclude this subsection two points are worth emphasising. First, the o⁄setting e⁄ects of pre-tax
national in￿ ation developments on union wide in￿ ation also hold for monetary unions composed of
countries of di⁄erent size: If the home country (where the consumption tax increase takes place) is,
for example, the smaller one of the two countries, the impact on home in￿ ation will be relatively
stronger, while the impact on in￿ ation of the foreign (and larger) country will be weaker. As a
result of these counteracting e⁄ects, pre-tax union-wide in￿ ation will not change. However if the
countries di⁄er with respect to their openness this reasoning needs to modi￿ed. For example, if the
home country is characterised by a stronger home bias the de￿ ationary e⁄ect in the home economy will
outweigh the in￿ ationary e⁄ect in the foreign economy. Consequently, pre-tax union wide in￿ ation will
decrease. Second, for the benchmark monetary union the union-wide output gap (i.e. the di⁄erence
between union-wide output levels under sticky and ￿ exible prices) is zero. Because of this feature, the
assumption of ￿yu = 0 in (15) is inconsequential, provided the countries satisfy the symmetric features
of the benchmark speci￿cation.
22This reasoning would require modi￿cations if the assumption of Calvo-style price-setting would be replaced by
state-dependent pricing, as discussed, for example, in Dotsey et al (1999).26
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5.2 Di⁄erent ￿scal adjustment speeds
This subsection analyses the impact of a once and for all, permanent increase in the home consumption
tax if the associated adjustments of labour taxes have a sluggish character, i.e. we drop the assumption
of balanced budgets during the transitional dynamics. To this end, we replace (14) against the broad
￿scal feedback rule studied by Mitchell et al. (2000) and Duarte and Wolman (2008), implying that
labour taxes adjust according to
￿L
t = ￿L




b;￿(bF;t ￿ bF) + ￿￿
￿b;￿(bF;t ￿ bF;t￿1);
where bH;t = BH;t=PH;tYH;t and bF;t = BF;t=PF;tYF;t denote the debt-output ratios of the two countries
(with target values bH and bF taken from Table 2). In line with the numerical speci￿cation of Duarte
and Wolman (2008), we calibrate the ￿scal feedback coe¢ cients as follows:23
Table 5: Parameters of alternative ￿scal policy rule
Response to debt-output ratio ￿b;￿ = ￿￿
b;￿ 0:04=16
Smoothing parameter ￿￿b;￿ = ￿￿
￿b;￿ 0:3=4
Figure 1 (dashed lines) shows the impulse responses from this alternative ￿scal closure. The sluggish
response of home and foreign labour taxes changes qualitatively the nature of the transitory dynamics
in both countries, compared with the in Section 5.1 discussed balanced-budget rule (bold lines). Since
labour taxes barely change on impact, the increase in the home consumption tax acts like a cost-push
shock in the ￿rst quarters. In particular, the home real consumer wage declines more strongly, leading
on impact to a stronger decline in home consumption. At the same time, the home real producer
wage now increases on impact. In other words, the transitory burden of the delayed response of the
compensating decline in the labour tax is shared by consumers and producers. Similar to a cost-push
shock, the increase in the home real producer wage ensures that home output now declines on impact
and, at the same time, we now observe a (small) increase in home producer in￿ ation. Moreover, with
the balanced-budget assumption being dropped, home real debt decreases and stays for many quarters
at below steady-state levels. As concerns the foreign economy, foreign consumption increases by less as
a result of the complete asset market condition. Since labour taxes stay initially virtually unchanged,
there is no change in the competitiveness between both countries, implying that the terms of trade
do not move on impact. This triggers a slightly stronger increase both in foreign producer real wages
and in foreign producer in￿ ation.
In sum, with labour taxes responding only slowly over time to the permanent increase in the home
consumption tax, this now creates in￿ ationary pressures in both countries. As a result, pre-tax union
wide in￿ ation increases, implying that monetary policy responds by increasing the nominal interest
rate. In other words, the delayed response of the compensating ￿scal measure in the home country not
only causes transitory ￿scal imbalances, but it also leads to union-wide in￿ ation e⁄ects, prompting a
reaction of monetary policy which was absent under the balanced-budget scenario.
23This calibration in Table 5 converts the annual values reported by Mitchell et al. (2000) into quarterly frequencies.
Alternatively, we also considered a ￿scal feedback rule of the type srH;t = ￿
m
d srH;t￿1 + ￿
m
b bH;t￿1; where srH;t and bH;t
denote, respectively, the primary surplus-output ratio and the debt-output ratio in the home country. In line with the
(cyclically adjusted) average estimation results for OECD countries reported in Gali and Perotti (2003, Table 2, p. 549),
we let ￿
m
d = 0:45 and ￿
m
b = 0.06. Under this calibration, the speci￿cation generates impulse responses which are similar
(although not entirely identical) to our balanced- budget scenario. Hence, we do not report them independently.27
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5.3 Di⁄erent targets of monetary policy
This subsection shifts focus and switches to a genuine aspect of monetary policy which a⁄ects the
short-run dynamics. Speci￿cally, we illustrate that the short-run response of key endogenous variables
like consumption, output and in￿ ation depends sensitively on whether the monetary policy reaction
speci￿es the consumer price in￿ ation objective net of indirect taxes or not.24 To this end, Figure 2
compares the ￿ndings from the benchmark speci￿cation, as discussed in Section 5:1, with an alternative
speci￿cation (dashed lines) in which, everything else being equal, the after-tax union-wide CPI in￿ ation
rate ￿￿C
U;t replaces ￿U;t in the monetary feedback rule (15). This change in the target variable has a
number of interesting implications. First, the alternative speci￿cation shows that, in principle, the
degree and the timing of the pass-through of the tax increase into consumer prices depends on the index
which underlies the in￿ ation objective. By this we mean that, if monetary policy reacts to ￿￿C
U;t; both
the pre-tax and the after-tax in￿ ation rates will be lower during the transition than in the benchmark
speci￿cation.25 Quantitatively, however, with the tax change being modelled as a genuine surprise and
with producer prices being largely predetermined, this relative decline in both in￿ ation measures is
insigni￿cant. Second, the change in ￿C pushes after-tax union wide in￿ ation above the target level of
in￿ ation and the interest rate reaction of monetary policy introduces for the transitional dynamics a
certain stabilisation trade-o⁄, i.e. consumption and output, both in the home and the foreign country,
are uniformly lower than in the benchmark speci￿cation. Speci￿cally, with monetary policy being no
longer neutral with respect to the tax change in the home country, this ￿nding implies that indirect
negative spillovers for the foreign country emerge which are triggered by the reaction of monetary
policy to union-wide variables. Moreover, under the two assumptions of i) the tax change being
modelled as a genuine surprise and ii) producer prices being largely predetermined, Figure 2 indicates
that gains in terms of lower in￿ ation are rather costly in terms of output and consumption sacri￿ces
during the transitional dynamics. However, it should be emphasised that the model does not capture a
number of other margins which would in￿ uence the assessment of this trade-o⁄ from a comprehensive
welfare perspective. In particular, during the entire transitional dynamics the assumption of rational
expectations ￿rmly anchors in￿ ation expectations and constrains wage settlements in a stabilising
manner. Hence, within our analysis there is no scope for so￿ called ￿ second-round￿e⁄ects of in￿ ation
which typically concern central banks.
5.4 Anticipated versus unanticipated policy changes
Another key feature which shapes the short-run dynamics relates to the fact that ￿scal policy changes
of the discussed type are typically not genuine surprises to the private sector when they become im-
plemented. To ignore implementation lags associated with ￿scal policymaking in rational expectation
models has quantitatively important implications, as shown by Yang (2005) and Leeper at al. (2008).
To con￿rm the importance of this aspect in our context, this subsection compares the benchmark re-
sults (of an unanticipated change in the tax structure) with an alternative scenario in which the change
in the tax structure is credibly announced and correctly anticipated four quarters ahead. The ex ante
announcement of the policy change a⁄ects the transitory dynamics in a sizable manner, as depicted
in Figure 3 (dashed lines). Three features are worth pointing out. First and most importantly, home
24For detailed references and a recent summary discussion of aspects related to the appropriate in￿ ation indices
stabilised by central banks, see, for example, Camba-Mendez (2003). Notice that in the particular context of our tax
experiments one may ￿nd it more suggestive to think of pre-tax in￿ ation as ￿ core in￿ ation￿ , while after-tax in￿ ation has
some correspondence to ￿ headline￿in￿ ation.
25Recall from above that this di⁄erence does not a⁄ect the long-run incidence of the ￿scal experiment. This feature
can also be seen in Figure 2 in which eventually the impulse responses of all variables converge against the same levels
under the two speci￿cations.28
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consumption increases immediately (i.e. at the time of the announcement of the future policy change)
in anticipation of higher consumption taxes in the future. This upward jump in home consumption is
sizable (i.e. about 0.2 percent of the steady-state value) and exerts on impact a signi￿cant demand
stimulus which pulls up both home output and home producer prices. However, re￿ ecting the pres-
ence of intertemporal substitution e⁄ects these movements are reversed in the future, i.e. once the
tax change has been implemented home consumption, home output and home producer price in￿ a-
tion are all lower than in the benchmark scenario. Second, the initial demand stimulus in the home
country spills over into the foreign country, leading on impact, relative to the benchmark scenario, to
an increase in foreign output and foreign producer price in￿ ation, while foreign consumption, because
of the complete asset market condition, on impact increases by less. Third, the in￿ ationary stimulus
in the two countries implies that on impact pre-tax union-wide CPI in￿ ation also rises. This feature
has the interesting implication that nominal interest rates increase on impact. In other words, due to
the anticipation e⁄ects of private consumers, monetary policy reacts even before the announced ￿scal
change has been implemented.
6 Using indirect taxes to fund government expenditures in the home
country: an alternative ￿scal scenario
This section argues that the results of Sections 4 and 5 change substantially if one considers an
alternative motivation of the unilateral consumption tax increase in the home country which di⁄ers
from the ￿scal devaluation hypothesis. In other words, it is shown that it is impossible to assess the
e⁄ects of an increase in the consumption tax in isolation, i.e. without a comprehensive description of
the entire ￿scal environment in which the tax change takes place. To demonstrate this, we investigate
a second tax change experiment in which the home country permanently increases its consumption tax
by 1 pp from 15% to 16% to ￿nance additional government expenditures, at unchanged levels of labour
taxes and long-run debt. The foreign country does not have actively any intention to change its taxes
and government spending levels, but, to keep its own level of real debt on target, it reacts passively by
adjusting its government expenditures. In sum, everything else being equal, in this second experiment
the consumption tax changes only in the home country, while government expenditures adjust in both
countries such that the long-run levels of government debt remain unchanged at constant labour tax
rates. Hence, maintaining all the other features of the benchmark speci￿cation, we replace (14) against
GBB
H;t =















Table 6 summarises the long-run e⁄ects of this alternative experiment which we discuss directly in
comparison with Table 4. The following di⁄erences are worth mentioning. First, for the closed
economy, the consumption tax ￿nanced increase of government expenditures, while leading to a slightly
stronger increase in home output, generates a substantial decrease in home consumption. This pattern
re￿ ects crowding out e⁄ects, i.e. to make room for the additional home government expenditures home
private consumption declines.26 Second, as concerns comparisons between various monetary unions
26The strongly negative e⁄ect of government expenditures on private consumption is well-known for this type of
model. In order to moderate or even to overturn it, one needs to restrict the (intertemporal) substitution in private29
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(which di⁄er in terms of the size of the two countries) and the closed economy, it is remarkable that
the e⁄ect on home output remains virtually unchanged, re￿ ecting the assumption of home bias in
government expenditures.
Table 6: Long-run e⁄ects of a permanent increase in ￿C to fund gov￿ t spending, percentage changes
Closed economy Monetary union
benchmark
Home bias ￿ no home bias (￿ = 1) home bias (￿ = 0:5)
Country size n = 1 n = 0:75 n = 0:5 n = 0:1 n = 0:5
Change in ￿C in pp 1 1 1 1 1
Change in GH=YH in pp 0:58 0:58 0:57 0:57 0:58
Change in ￿C￿ in pp ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Change in G￿
F=Y ￿
F in pp ￿ 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:00
Terms of trade ￿ ￿0:45 ￿0:45 ￿0:45 ￿0:40
Real exchange rate ￿ 0 0 0 ￿0:20
Home consumption ￿0:66 ￿0:61 ￿0:55 ￿0:45 ￿0:61
Home output 0:19 0:19 0:19 0:18 0:17
Home consumer real wage ￿0:87 ￿0:75 ￿0:64 ￿0:47 ￿0:77
Foreign consumption ￿ ￿0:19 ￿0:12 ￿0:03 ￿0:07
Foreign output ￿ 0:01 0:01 0:00 0:02
Foreign consumer real wage ￿ ￿0:36 ￿0:24 ￿0:06 ￿0:11
Change in bH in pp ￿0:80 ￿1:09 ￿1:55 ￿0:73
Change in bF in pp ￿ 0:87 0:58 0:12 0:22
Third, the latter feature also ensures that there are no spillovers on foreign output, implying that the
open economy aspects are very di⁄erent from the ￿scal devaluation scenario discussed above. Instead,
the tax ￿nanced increase in government expenditures acts like a demand stimulus in the home country,
implying that PH rises relative to PF; i.e. the terms of trade T = PF=PH decline. Similar to our
discussion of equation (26) in Section 4.3 and as shown in the Appendix, changes in the terms of
trade do not directly depend on changes in consumption taxes. Instead, they are, again, driven by




1 + ￿￿(dC + dC￿)
(b GF;t ￿ b GH;t) (29)
Yet, since the compensating variations in b GH;t and b GF;t are of opposite sign (compared with b ￿L
t and
b ￿L￿
t ); the terms of trade move in opposite direction, i.e. they decline. This decline of the terms of
trade moderates the crowding out of home consumption, i.e. it ensures that home consumption falls
by less than in the closed economy case. By contrast, it hurts foreign consumers such that foreign
consumption declines. Fourth, the magnitude of the terms of trade related e⁄ects on consumption
is, again, a monotonic function of the relative size of the two economies. Speci￿cally, the outcomes
for the home country di⁄er most strongly from the closed economy scenario if the home country is
consumption, as addressed in the literature which allows for non-Ricardian consumers (in particular, see Gali et al.
(2007)). For monetary union models with this feature, see Canzoneri et al. (2005) and Coenen et al. (2007).30
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small. Similarly, the e⁄ects on foreign consumption are strongest if the foreign country is small. Fifth,
as concerns monetary unions with a positive home bias in consumption, the adjustment of the real
exchange rate reduces the exposure of consumers to the terms of trade channel. Hence, in the presence
of home bias, home consumption, ceteris paribus, decreases by more and foreign consumption by less,
as to be inferred from comparing the third and the ￿fth column in Table 6:
In sum, these e⁄ects di⁄er substantially from the ￿scal devaluation scenario discussed in Section 4.
Most importantly, there are no longer spillover e⁄ects on foreign output. Moreover, the terms of trade
move into the opposite direction, implying that foreign consumption is negatively a⁄ected. Yet, the
magnitude of this negative spillover on consumption is small, re￿ ecting that the ￿scal experiment in
the home country leaves little scope for interactions between the two countries in the ￿rst place.
6.2 Short-run e⁄ects
The above summarised long-run e⁄ects are associated with a distinct pattern of short-run dynamics.
As shown in Figure 4 (dashed lines) these short-run dynamics are qualitatively di⁄erent from the
benchmark economy (characterised by labour tax adjustments), as discussed in Section 5.1 (bold
lines). These di⁄erences can be most easily inferred from the di⁄erent behaviour of the terms of trade,
which decline slowly over time to the lower long-run value. To absorb the demand stimulus in the
home economy, triggered by the increase in home government expenditures, home output overshoots
during the ￿rst quarters. This overshooting of home output is accompanied by an increase in home
real producer wages and home producer in￿ ation. In the foreign economy, these impact e⁄ects are of
opposite sign, i.e. foreign output undershoots, leading to a decline in foreign real producer wages and
foreign producer in￿ ation. Hence, compared with the benchmark speci￿cation discussed in Section
5.1., the (pre-tax) in￿ ationary and de￿ ationary e⁄ects in the two countries are strictly of opposite
sign. Interestingly, these country-speci￿c in￿ ation developments o⁄set each other at the aggregate
level such that monetary policy - like in the benchmark speci￿cation - does not react. In other
words, the implications for the aggregate picture of in￿ ation are identical, despite the fact that the
country-speci￿c in￿ ation developments are of opposite nature.
7 Conclusion
This paper considers a two-country model of a monetary union to discuss monetary and ￿scal inter-
actions between member countries of a monetary union in response to a unilateral ￿scal reform in one
of the countries. The paper addresses a number of questions which emerge if one of the countries di-
rects its tax structure more strongly towards indirect taxes. In particular, we distinguish between two
di⁄erent ￿scal scenarios in which the additional indirect tax revenues of the reform country are either
used to ￿nance a cut in labour taxes (in line with the ￿scal devaluation hypothesis), or, alternatively,
to fund additional government spending. Our analysis reveals that for these two scenarios the terms
of trade move in opposite directions, implying that the long-run e⁄ects on output and consumption
within and between the countries are qualitatively di⁄erent. Moreover, from a short-run perspective,
all these e⁄ects are shown to depend on a number of additional channels which we discuss in isolated
experiments. Speci￿cally, depending on whether i) the ￿scal reform allows for temporary budget im-
balances or not, ii) the central bank￿ s objective is speci￿ed in terms of pre-tax or after-tax consumer
prices, and iii) the policy change is anticipated by the private sector or not, short-run dynamics ex-
hibit signi￿cant di⁄erences. Quantitatively, the calibrated model version indicates that only if the
additional indirect tax revenues are used to ￿nance a cut in direct taxes there is some, though limited,
scope for non-negligible spillovers between countries.31
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To obtain clear analytical ￿ndings associated with the terms of trade channel, the paper makes a
number of simplifying assumptions. In particular, redistribution e⁄ects within countries are negligible,
and government expenditures play no interesting role. Similarly, the model counterfactually imposes
linear tax schedules for direct and indirect taxes. Moreover, it would be of interest to compare the
results of this paper with an alternative set-up which allows for incomplete asset markets between
countries. Extensions of the model in these directions are left fur future work. Finally, the analysis
takes a strictly positive perspective to discuss implications of unilateral ￿scal reforms. Not least
because of the beggar-thy-neighbour nature of output e⁄ects associated with such reforms, it seems
worthwhile to re-investigate the issue at hand in future work in an optimal policy framework which
allows for strategic behaviour of policymakers in both countries.
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Table A.1 Characteristics of euro area countries
Consumption tax rate Labour tax rate Debt to GDP ratio
Euro Area 19.46 39.17 69.06
Austria 21.53 40.58 64.82
Belgium 21.64 43.5 106.45
Finland 28.25 43.49 45.53
France 21.03 41.82 60.65
Germany 18.46 40.09 62.07
Greece 18.21 37.96 105.52
Ireland 25.74 27.48 41.66
Italy 17.29 43.24 110.16
Luxembourg 22.76 29.23 6.77
Netherlands 24.08 31.94 57.15
Portugal 19.66 28.08 57.53
Spain 15.66 28.89 54.7
Note: All the data are taken from Eurostat (source folders: Economy and Finance, Annual Government
Finance Statistics). Data on consumption and labour tax rates are implicit tax rates by economic
function. The values shown are averages (in %) over the period 1996 - 2006.
8.2 Log-linearization around the steady state
This Appendix summarises the log-linearisation of the model around the steady state summarised in
Section 2:6; for both the ￿ exible price economy and the sticky price economy. Let key steady-state


































8.2.1 The ￿ exible price economy
Real consumer wage:
b !c
H;t = b pH;t ￿ wCb ￿C
t ￿ wLb ￿L
t
b !c
F;t = b pF;t ￿ wC￿b ￿C￿
t ￿ wL￿b ￿L￿
t ;35
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with:
b pH;t = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)b Tt and b pF;t = ￿￿ b Tt:
Labour supply:
b !c
H;t = ￿b YH;t + ￿b Ct
b !c
F;t = ￿b YF;t + ￿b C￿
t
Market clearing:
b YH;t = dCH(c Ct + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)b Tt) + dC￿H(b C￿
t + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)b Tt) + dGH b GH;t
b YF;t = dCF(c Ct ￿ ￿￿ b Tt) + dC￿F(b C￿
t ￿ ￿￿￿ b Tt) + dGF b GF;t
Complete asset markets:
b C￿
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t+1
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t+1
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= ￿(Et b C￿




H;t = b Rt ￿ b ￿t+1 and b Rr
F;t = b Rt ￿ b ￿￿
t+1
Relationship between real exchange rate and terms of trade:
c RSt = (￿ ￿ ￿￿) b Tt
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Benchmark with di⁄erent ￿scal adjustment speed (Section 5.2):
b ￿L
t = ￿0
b;￿b bH;t + ￿0
￿b;￿(b bH;t ￿b bH;t￿1)
b ￿L￿
t = ￿0￿
b;￿b bF;t + ￿0￿
￿b;￿(b bF;t ￿b bF;t￿1)
where b bH;t = b Br
H;t ￿ b pH;t ￿ b YH;t; b bF;t = b Br
















8.2.2 The sticky price economy
The equations for the labour supply, market clearing, complete asset markets, the Euler conditions, the
relationship between the real exchange rate and the terms of trade, and the ￿scal policy speci￿cations
are identical with the ￿ exible price economy. In addition, we use:
New Keynesian Phillips-curve:
b ￿H;t = kH(b !c
H;t + wCb ￿C
t + wLb ￿L
t + (1 ￿ ￿)b Tt) + ￿Etb ￿H;t+1
b ￿F;t = kF(b !c
F;t + wC￿b ￿C￿
t + wL￿b ￿L￿
t ￿ ￿￿ b Tt) + ￿Etb ￿F;t+1
Monetary policy rule:
b Rt = ￿yu(1 ￿ ￿)b Y U
t￿1 + ￿￿u(1 ￿ ￿)b ￿U
t￿1 + ￿b Rt￿1
b ￿U
t = sCb ￿t + (1 ￿ sC)b ￿￿
t
b Y U
t = ((1 ￿ sC)￿￿ ￿ sY + sC￿) b Tt + sY b YH;t + (1 ￿ sY ) b YF;t
where sY = nPHYH
PUYU :

















t ￿ b ￿C￿
t￿1
￿
Relationships between in￿ ation rates and terms of trade:
b ￿t = ￿b ￿H;t + (1 ￿ ￿)b ￿F;t
b ￿￿
t = ￿￿b ￿H;t + (1 ￿ ￿￿)b ￿F;t
b Tt = b ￿F;t ￿ b ￿H;t + b Tt￿1
8.2.3 Equations used in Section 4
To derive equation (26), let b ￿C￿
t = 0; b GH;t = b GF;t = 0: Moreover, assuming there exists no home bias
(￿ = ￿￿ = 1), this implies ￿ = ￿￿ = n and c RSt = 0: Combining the equations for real consumer wages,





￿(1 ￿ n)b Tt ￿ wCb ￿C
t ￿ wLb ￿L






nb Tt ￿ wL￿b ￿L￿
t ￿ ￿b Ct ￿ wCb ￿C
t
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Combining the equations for market clearing and complete asset markets yields
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Since the two economies are assumed to be structurally identical and calibrated at the same initial
￿scal positions, output levels per capita must also be identical, implying dCH = dCF ￿ dC and
dC￿H = dC￿F ￿ dC￿:Then, by combining the two pairs of equations and substituting out for i) b YH;t
and b YF;t and ii) b Ct one can solve for b Tt; leading to
b Tt =
1
1 + ￿￿(dC + dC￿)
(wL￿b ￿L￿
t ￿ wLb ￿L
t )
which is equation (26) in the main text. Using this expression in the above derived expressions for c Ct
and b YH;t, one readily veri￿es
c Ct = ￿
1 + dC￿ ￿
￿




￿ (dC + dC￿) + ￿
wLb ￿L
t ￿ (1 ￿ n)
1















1 + ￿￿(dC + dC￿)
￿
wLb ￿L








￿ (dC + dC￿)
￿
1
1 + ￿￿(dC + dC￿)
and ￿ > 0 if ￿￿ > 1: Moreover, one can also verify that the equations (27) and (28), in which b Tt has
not yet been substituted out, are equivalent to these expressions for c Ct and b YH;t:
8.2.4 Equations used in Section 6
To derive equation (29), let b ￿C￿
t = 0; b ￿L
t = b ￿L￿
t = 0: Assuming there exists no home bias, i.e.
￿ = ￿￿ = n and c RSt = 0: Combining the equations for real consumer wages, labour supplies and





￿(1 ￿ n)b Tt ￿ wCb ￿C






nb Tt ￿ ￿b Ct ￿ wCb ￿C
t
i
Combining the equations for market clearing and complete asset markets yields






t + ￿(1 ￿ n)b Tt
￿
+ dGH b GH;t






t ￿ ￿nb Tt
￿
+ dGF b GF;t
Invoke dCH = dCF ￿ dC and dC￿H = dC￿F ￿ dC￿ and let dGH = dGF = dG: Then, by combining the




1 + ￿￿(dC + dC￿)
(b GF;t ￿ b GH;t)
8.3 Short run analysis38
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